sometimes you have to try, try again
Wednesday, February 27, 2013
Tuesday, November 20, 2012
Faces
A person's face can have degrees of opaqueness. A face can have different masks. Many people tend to wear a mask that is blank and unchanging. A kind of plastic image. But if a person is not trying to "mask" their feelings, and is feeling something, their face can be read easily, even though it would be impossible to explain how it is that their expression is being read. Like the eye can be a window to the soul, the face can be a page of thought, or feeling.
That a good actor can consciously do this is food for thought.
Saturday, October 23, 2010
Friday, October 22, 2010
Wednesday, December 06, 2006
Sunday, May 07, 2006
Bush's prime-time news conference 3-6-03
Good evening. I'm pleased to take your questions tonight and to discuss with the American people the serious matters facing our country and the world.
This has been an important week on two fronts on our war against terror. First, thanks to the hard work of American and Pakistani officials, we captured the mastermind of the September 11th attacks against our nation.
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed conceived and planned the hijackings and directed the actions of the hijackers. We believe his capture will further disrupt the terror network and their planning for additional attacks.
Second, we have arrived at an important moment in confronting the threat posed to our nation and to peace by Saddam Hussein and his weapons of terror.
In New York tomorrow, the United Nations Security Council will receive an update from the chief weapons inspector. The world needs him to answer a single question: Has the Iraqi regime fully and unconditionally disarmed as required by Resolution 1441 or has it not?
Iraq's dictator has made a public show of producing and destroying a few missiles, missiles that violate the restrictions set out more than 10 years ago.
Yet our intelligence shows that even as he is destroying these few missiles, he has ordered the continued production of the very same type of missiles.
Iraqi operatives continue to hide biological and chemical agents to avoid detection by inspectors.
In some cases, these materials have been moved to different locations every 12 to 24 hours or placed in vehicles that are in residential neighborhoods.
We know from multiple intelligence sources that Iraqi weapons scientists continue to be threatened with harm should they cooperate with U.N. inspectors.
Scientists are required by Iraqi intelligence to wear concealed recording devices during interviews, and hotels where interviews take place are bugged by the regime.
These are not the actions of a regime that is disarming. These are the actions of a regime engaged in a willful charade. These are the actions of a regime that systematically and deliberately is defying the world.
If the Iraqi regime were disarming, we would know it because we would see it. Iraq's weapons would be presented to inspectors and the world would witness their destruction.
Instead, with the world demanding disarmament, and more than 200,000 troops positioned near his country, Saddam Hussein's response is to produce a few weapons for show, while he hides the rest and builds even more.
Inspection teams do not need more time or more personnel. All they need is what they have never received — the full cooperation of the Iraqi regime.
Token gestures are not acceptable. The only acceptable outcome is the one already defined by a unanimous vote of the Security Council: total disarmament.
Great Britain, Spain and the United States have introduced a new resolution stating that Iraq has failed to meet the requirements of Resolution 1441. Saddam Hussein is not disarming. This is a fact. It cannot be denied.
Saddam Hussein has a long history of reckless aggression and terrible crimes. He possesses weapons of terror. He provides funding and training and safe haven to terrorists, terrorists who would willingly use weapons of mass destruction against America and other peace-loving countries.
Saddam Hussein and his weapons are a direct threat to this country, to our people and to all free people.
If the world fails to confront the threat posed by the Iraqi regime, refusing to use force even as a last resort, free nations would assume the immense and unacceptable risks.
The attacks of September the 11th, 2001, show what the enemies of America did with four airplanes. We will not wait to see what terrorists or terrorist states could do with weapons of mass destruction.
We are determined to confront threats wherever they arise. I will not leave the American people at the mercy of the Iraqi dictator and his weapons.
In the event of conflict, America also accepts our responsibility to protect innocent lives in every way possible.
We will bring food and medicine to the Iraqi people. We will help that nation to build a just government after decades of brutal dictatorship.
The form and leadership of that government is for the Iraqi people to choose. Anything they choose will be better than the misery and torture and murder they have known under Saddam Hussein.
Across the world and in every part of America people of good will are hoping and praying for peace. Our goal is peace for our nation, for our friends and allies, for the people of the Middle East.
People of good will must also recognize that allowing a dangerous dictator to defy the world and harbor weapons of mass murder and terror is not peace at all, it is pretense.
The cause of peace will be advanced only when the terrorists lose a wealthy patron and protector, and when the dictator is fully and finally disarmed.
Tonight I thank the men and women of our armed services and their families.
I know their deployment so far from home is causing hardship for many military families. Our nation is deeply grateful to all who serve in uniform.
We appreciate your commitment, your idealism and your sacrifice. We support you. And we know that if peace must be defended, you are ready.
Ron Fournier?
Q: Let me see if I can further — if you could further define what you just called this important moment we're in. Since you made it clear just now that you don't think that Saddam has disarmed and we have a quarter million troops in the Persian Gulf and now that you've called on the world to be ready to use force as a last resort, are we just days away from the point at which you decide whether or not we go to war? And what harm would it do to give Saddam a final ultimatum, a two- or three-day deadline to disarm or face force?
BUSH: Well, we're still in the final stages of diplomacy. I'm spending a lot of time on the phone talking to fellow leaders about the need for the United Nations Security Council to state the facts, which is Saddam Hussein hasn't disarmed.
1441, the Security Council resolution passed unanimously last fall, said clearly that Saddam Hussein has one last chance to disarm.
He hasn't disarmed. So we're working with Security Council members to resolve this issue at the Security Council.
This is not only an important moment for the security of our nation, I believe it's an important moment for the Security Council itself. And the reason I say that is because this issue has been before the Security Council, the issue of disarmament of Iraq, for 12 long years.
And the fundamental question facing the Security Council is will its words mean anything; when the Security Council speaks, will the words have merit and weight? I think it's important for those words to have merit and weight, because I understand that in order to win the war against terror, there must be a united effort to do so. And we must work together to defeat terror.
Iraq is a part of the war on terror. Iraq is a country that has got terrorist ties, it's a country with wealth, it's a country that trains terrorists, a country that could arm terrorists. And our fellow Americans must understand, in this new war against terror, that we not only must chase down al-Qaida terrorists, we must deal with weapons of mass destruction as well.
That's what the United Nations Security Council has been talking about for 12 long years.
It's now time for this issue to come to a head at the Security Council, and it will.
As far as ultimatums and all of the speculation about what may or may not happen after next week, we'll just wait and see.
Steve?
Q: (Inaudible)
BUSH: Well, we're days away from resolving this issue at the Security Council.
Q: Thank you. Another hot spot is North Korea. If North Korea restarts their plutonium plant, will that change your thinking about how to handle this crisis? Or are you resigned to North Korea becoming a nuclear power?
BUSH: This is a regional issue. I say regional issue because there's a lot of countries that have got a direct stake into whether or not North Korea has nuclear weapons. We've got a stake as to whether North Korea has a nuclear weapon. China clearly has a stake as to whether or not North Korea has a nuclear weapon. South Korea, of course, has a stake. Japan has got a significant stake as to whether or not North Korea has a nuclear weapon. Russia has a stake.
So, therefore, I think the best way to deal with this is in multilateral fashion by convincing those nations that they must stand up to their responsibility, along with the United States, to convince Kim Jong Il that the development of a nuclear arsenal is not in his nation's interests, and that should he want help in easing the suffering of the North Korean people, the best way to achieve that help is to not proceed forward.
We've tried bilateral negotiations with North Korea. My predecessor, in a good-faith effort, entered into a framework agreement. The United States honored its side of the agreement; North Korea didn't.
While we felt the agreement was enforced, North Korea was enriching uranium. In my judgment the best way to deal with North Korea is to convince the parties to assume their responsibility.
I was heartened by the fact that Jiang Zemin, when he came to Crawford, Texas, made it very clear to me and publicly, as well, that a nuclear weapons-free peninsula was in China's interests.
And so we're working with China and the other nations I mentioned to bring a multilateral pressure and to convince Kim Jong Il that the development of a nuclear arsenal is not in his interests.
Dave?
Q: Mr. President, you and your top advisers, notably Secretary of State Powell, have repeatedly said that we have shared with our allies all of the current, up-to-date intelligence information that proves the imminence of the threat we face from Saddam Hussein and that they have been sharing their intelligence as well. If all of these nations, all of them our normal allies, have access to the same intelligence information, why is it that they are reluctant to think that the threat is so real, so imminent that we need to move to the brink of war now?
And in relation to that, today, the British foreign minister, Jack Straw, suggested at the U.N. that it might be time to look at amending the resolution perhaps with an eye toward a timetable, like that proposed by the Canadians some two weeks ago, that would set a firm deadline to give Saddam Hussein a little bit of time to come clean. And also, obviously, that would give you a little bit of a chance to build more support with any members of the Security Council.
Is that something that the governments should be pursuing at the U.N. right now?
BUSH: We, of course, are consulting with our allies at the United Nations.
But I meant what I said. This is the last phase of diplomacy. A little bit more time: Saddam Hussein has had 12 years to disarm. He is deceiving people. This is important for our fellow citizens to realize that if he really intended to disarm like the world has asked him to do, we would know whether he was disarming. He's trying to buy time.
I can understand why: He's been successful with these tactics for 12 years.
Saddam Hussein is a threat to our nation. September the 11th changed the strategic thinking, at least as far as I was concerned, for how to protect our country. My job is to protect the American people.
It used to be that we could think that you could contain a person like Saddam Hussein, that oceans would protect us from his type of terror.
September the 11th should say to the American people that we are now a battlefield, that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist organization could be deployed here at home.
So therefore I think the threat is real. And so do a lot of other people in my government. And since I believe the threat is real and since my most important job is to protect the security of the American people, that's precisely what we will do.
Our demands are that Saddam Hussein disarm. We hope he does. We have worked with the international community to convince him to disarm. If he doesn't disarm, we'll disarm him.
You asked about sharing of intelligence, and I appreciate that, because we do share a lot of intelligence with nations which may or may not agree with us in the Security Council as to how to deal with Saddam Hussein and his threats.
We've got roughly 90 countries engaged in Operating Enduring Freedom, chasing down the terrorists. We do communicate a lot. And we will continue to communicate a lot.
We must communicate. We must share intelligence. We must share — we must cut off money together. We must smoke these al-Qaida types out one at a time.
It's in our national interest as well that we deal with Saddam Hussein.
But America is not alone in this sentiment. There are a lot of countries who fully understand the threat of Saddam Hussein. A lot of countries realize that the credibility of the Security Council is at stake; a lot of countries, like America, who hope that he would have disarmed, and a lot of countries which realize that it may require force, may require force to disarm him.
Jim Angle?
Q: Thank you, Mr. President.
Sir, if you haven't already made the choice to go to war, can you tell us what you are waiting to hear or see before you do make that decision?
And if I may, during a recent demonstration many of the protesters suggested that the U.S. was a threat to peace, which prompted you to wonder out loud why they didn't see Saddam Hussein as a threat to peace.
I wonder why you think so many people around the world take a different view of the threat that Saddam Hussein poses than you and your allies.
BUSH: Well, first, I — you know, I appreciate societies in which people can express their opinion. That society — free speech stands in stark contrast to Iraq.
Secondly, I've seen all kinds of protests since I've been the president.
I remember the protests against trade. A lot of people didn't feel like free trade was good for the world. I completely disagree. I think free trade is good for both wealthy and impoverished nations. But that didn't change my opinion about trade. As a matter of fact, I went to the Congress to get trade promotion authority.
I recognize there are people who don't like war. I don't like war.
I wish that Saddam Hussein had listened to the demands of the world and disarmed. That was my hope.
That's why I first went to the United Nations to begin with on September the 12th, 2002, to address this issue as forthrightly as I knew how.
That's why, months later, we went to the Security Council to get another resolution, called 1441, which was unanimously approved by the Security Council demanding that Saddam Hussein disarm.
I'm hopeful that he does disarm.
But in the name of peace and the security of our people, if he won't do so voluntarily, we will disarm him, and other nations will join him — join us in disarming him.
And that creates a certain sense of anxiety. I understand that. Nobody likes war.
The only thing I can do is assure the loved ones of those who wear our uniform that if we have to go to war, if war is upon us because Saddam Hussein has made that choice, we will have the best equipment available for our troops, the best plan available for victory, and we will respect innocent life in Iraq.
The risk of doing nothing, the risk of hoping that Saddam Hussein changes his mind and becomes a gentle soul, the risk that somehow inaction will make the world safer, is a risk I'm not willing to take for the American people.
King — John King?
(Crosstalk)
BUSH: This is unscripted.
Q: Thank you, Mr. President. Sir, how would you answer your critics who say that they think this is somehow personal? As Senator Kennedy put it tonight, he said your fixation with Saddam Hussein is making the world a more dangerous place.
And as you prepare the American people for the possibility of military conflict, could you share with us any of the scenarios your advisers have shared with you about worst-case scenarios, in terms of the potential cost of American lives, the potential cost to the American economy and the potential risks of retaliatory terrorist strikes here at home?
BUSH: My job is to protect America and that's exactly what I'm going to do.
People can describe all kinds of intentions. I swore to protect and defend the Constitution, that's what I swore to do. I put my hand on the Bible and took that oath. And that's exactly what I am going to do.
I believe Saddam Hussein is a threat to the American people. I believe he's a threat to the neighborhood in which he lives.
And I've got good evidence to believe that. He has weapons of mass destruction, and he has used weapons of mass destruction in his neighborhood and on his own people. He's invaded countries in his neighborhood. He tortures his own people. He's a murderer. He has trained and financed al-Qaida-type organizations before — al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations.
I take the threat seriously, and I'll deal with the threat. I hope it can be done peacefully.
The rest of your six-point question?
Q: The potential crisis in terms of ...
BUSH: No, thanks.
Q: ... for the economy, terrorism.
BUSH: The price of doing nothing exceeds the price of taking action if we have to. We will do everything we can to minimize the loss of life.
The price of the attacks on America, the cost of the attacks on America on September 11th were enormous. They were significant. And I'm not willing to take that chance again, John.
Terry Moran?
Q: Thank you, sir.
May I follow up on Jim Angle's question? In the past several weeks your policy on Iraq has generated opposition from the governments of France, Russia, China, Germany, Turkey, the Arab League and many other countries, opened a rift at NATO and at the U.N. and drawn millions of ordinary citizens around the world into the streets into anti-war protests.
May I ask what went wrong that so many governments and peoples around the world now not only disagree with you very strongly, but see the U.S. under your leadership as an arrogant power?
BUSH: I think if you remember back prior to the resolution coming out of the United Nations last fall, I suspect you might have asked a question along those lines: How come you can't get anybody to support your resolution? If I remember correctly, there was a lot of doubt as to whether or not we were even going to get any votes. We would get our own, of course.
And the vote came out 15 to nothing, Terry. And I think you will see when it's all said and done, if we have to use force, a lot of nations will be with us.
You clearly name some that — France and Germany express their opinions. We have a disagreement over how best to deal with Saddam Hussein. I understand that.
Having said that, they're still our friends, and we'll deal with them as friends. We've got a lot of common interests. Our trans-Atlantic relationships are very important.
And while they may disagree with how we deal with Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction, there was no disagreement when it came time to vote on 1441, as least as far as France was concerned. They joined us. They said Saddam Hussein has one last chance of disarming.
If they think more time will cause him to disarm, I disagree with that. He's a master of deception. He has no intention of disarming. Otherwise, we would have known.
There's a lot of talk about inspectors. It would have taken a handful of inspectors to determine whether he was disarming. They could've showed up at a parking lot and he could've brought his weapons and destroyed them.
That's not what he chose to do.
Secondly, I make my decisions based upon the oath I took, the one I just described to you. I believe Saddam Hussein is a threat — is a threat to the American people. He's a threat to people in his neighborhood. He's also a threat to the Iraqi people.
One of the things we love in America is freedom. If I may, I'd like to remind you what I said at the State of the Union: Liberty is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to each and every person. And that's what I believe.
I believe that when we see totalitarianism, that we must deal with it. We don't have to do it always militarily.
But this is a unique circumstance because of 12 years of denial and defiance, because of terrorist connections, because of past history.
I'm convinced that a liberated Iraq will be important for that troubled part of the world. The Iraqi people are plenty capable of governing themselves. Iraq's a sophisticated society. Iraq's got money. Iraq will provide a place where people can see that the Shia and the Sunni and the Kurds can get along in a federation. Iraq will serve as a catalyst for change — positive change.
So there's a lot more at stake than just American security and the security of people close by Saddam Hussein. Freedom is at stake, as well. And I take that very seriously.
Gregory?
Q: Mr. President, good evening.
If you order war, can any military operation be considered a success if the United States does not capture Saddam Hussein, as you once said, “dead or alive”?
BUSH: Well, I hope we don't have to go to war. But if we go to war we will disarm Iraq. And if we go to war there will be a regime change. And replacing this cancer inside of Iraq will be a government that represents the rights of all the people, a government which represents the voices of the Shia and the Sunni and the Kurds.
We care about the suffering of the Iraqi people. I mentioned in my opening comments that there's a lot of food ready to go in. There's something like 55,000 oil-for-food distribution points in Iraq.
We know where they are. We fully intend to make sure that they've got ample food. We know where their hospitals are. We want to make sure they've got ample medical supplies.
The life of the Iraqi citizen's going to dramatically improve.
Q: Is success contingent upon capturing or killing Saddam Hussein in your mind?
BUSH: We will be changing the regime of Iraq for the good of the Iraqi people.
Bill Plante?
Q: Mr. President, to a lot of people it seems that war is probably inevitable, because many people doubt — most people I would guess — that Saddam Hussein will ever do what we are demanding that he do, which is disarm.
And if war is inevitable, there are a lot of people in this country — as much as half by polling standards — who agree that he should be disarmed, who listen to you say that you have the evidence, but who feel they haven't seen it, and who still wonder why blood has to be shed if he hasn't attacked us.
BUSH: Well, Bill, if they believe he should be disarmed and he's not going to disarm, there's only way to disarm him. And that is going to be my last choice: the use of force.
Secondly, the American people know that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction.
By the way, he declared he didn't have any. 1441 insisted that he have a complete declaration of his weapons. He said he didn't have any weapons.
And secondly, he's used these weapons before. I mean, we're not speculating about the nature of the man. We know the nature of the man.
Colin Powell, in an eloquent address to the United Nations, described some of the information we were at liberty of talking about. He mentioned a man named al-Zarqawi who is in charge of the poison network. It's a man who was wounded in Afghanistan, received aid in Baghdad, ordered the killing of a U.S. citizen — USAID employee, was harbored in Iraq.
There is a poison plant in northeast Iraq.
To assume that Saddam Hussein knew none of this was going on is not to really understand the nature of the Iraqi society. There's a lot of facts which make it clear to me and many others that Saddam is a threat. And we're not going to wait until he does attack. We're not going to hope that he changes his attitude. We're not going to assume that, you know, he is a different kind of person than he has been.
So in the name of security and peace, if we have to — if we have to, we'll disarm him. I hope he disarms, or perhaps I hope he leaves the country. I hear a lot of talk from different nations around where Saddam Hussein might be exiled. That would be fine with me, just so long as Iraq disarms after he's exiled.
Let's see here, Elizabeth?
Q: Thank you, Mr. President.
As you said, the Security Council faces a vote next week on a resolution implicitly authorizing an attack on Iraq. Will you call for a vote on that resolution, even if you aren't sure you have the votes?
BUSH: Well, first, I don't think — it basically says that he is in defiance of 1441. That's what the resolution says.
And it's hard to believe anybody saying he isn't in defiance of 1441 because 1441 said he must disarm.
And yes, we'll call for a vote.
Q: No matter what?
BUSH: No matter what the whip count is, we're calling for the vote. We want to see people stand up and say what their opinion is about Saddam Hussein and the utility of the United Nations Security Council.
And so, you bet. It's time for people to show their cards, let the world know where they stand when it comes to Saddam.
Mark Knoller?
Q: Mr. President, are you worried that the United States might be viewed as defiant of the United Nations if you went ahead with military action without specific and explicit authorization from the U.N.?
BUSH: No, I'm not worried about that.
As a matter of fact, it's hard to say the United States is defiant about the United Nations when I was the person who took the issue to the United Nations September the 12th, 2002.
We've been working with the United Nations. We've been working through the United Nations.
Secondly, I'm confident the American people understand that when it comes to our security, if we need to act, we will act. And we really don't need United Nations approval to do so.
I want to work — I want the United Nations to be effective. It's important for it to be a robust, capable body. It's important for its words to mean what they say. And as we head into the 21st century, Mark, when it comes to our security, we really don't need anybody's permission.
Bill?
Q: Thank you, Mr. President.
Even though our military can certainly prevail without a northern front, isn't Turkey making it at least slightly more challenging for us, and therefore at least slightly more likely that American lives will be lost? And if they don't reverse course, would you stop backing their entry into the European Union?
BUSH: The answer to your second question is I support Turkey going into the EU.
Turkey's a friend. They're a NATO ally. We'll continue to work with Turkey. We've got contingencies in place that should our troops not come through Turkey — not be allowed to come through Turkey. And no, that won't cause any more hardship for our troops; I'm confident of that.
April, did you have a question, or did I call upon you cold?
Q: No, I have a question.
BUSH: OK, I'm sure you do have a question.
Q: Mr. President, as the nation is at odds over war, with many organizations like the Congressional Black Caucus pushing for continued diplomacy through the U.N., how is your faith guiding you? And what should you tell America? Well, what should America do collectively as you instructed before 9/11? Should it be prayer? Because you are saying, “Let's continue the war on terror.”
BUSH: I appreciate that question a lot.
First, for those who urge more diplomacy, I would simply say that diplomacy hasn't worked. We've tried diplomacy for 12 years. Saddam Hussein hasn't disarmed. He's armed.
And we live in a dangerous world. We live in new circumstances in our country, and I hope people remember the — I know they remember the tragedy of September the 11th, but I hope they understand the lesson of September the 11th.
The lesson is that we're vulnerable to attach wherever it may occur, and we must take threats which gather overseas very seriously. We don't have to deal with them all militarily, but we must deal with them.
And in the case of Iraq, it is now time for him to disarm. For the sake of peace, if we have to use our troops, we will.
My faith sustains me, because I pray daily. I pray for guidance and wisdom and strength.
If we were to commit our troops — if we were to commit our troops I would pray for their safety, and I would pray for the safety of innocent Iraqi lives as well.
One thing that's really great about our country is that there are thousands of people who pray for me who I'll never see and be able to thank. But it's a humbling experience to think that people I will never have met have lifted me and my family up in prayer. And for that I'm grateful. It's been a comforting feeling to know that is true.
I pray for peace, April. I pray for peace.
Hutch?
Q: As you know, not everyone shares your optimistic vision of how this might play out. Do you ever worry, maybe in the wee, small hours, that you might be wrong and they might be right in thinking that this could lead to more terrorism, more anti-American sentiment, more instability in the Middle East?
BUSH: I think, first of all, it's hard to envision more terror on America than September the 11th, 2001. We did nothing to provoke that terrorist attack. It came upon us because there is an enemy which hates America. They hate what we stand for. We love freedom, and we're not changing.
And therefore, so long as there's a terrorist network like al-Qaida and others willing to fund them, finance them, equip them, we're at war.
And so I — you know, obviously I've thought long and hard about the use of troops. I think about it all of the time. It is my responsibility to commit the troops.
I believe we'll prevail. I know we'll prevail.
And out of that disarmament of Saddam will come a better world, particularly for the people who live in Iraq.
This is a society, Ron, who — which has been decimated by his murderous ways, his torture. He doesn't allow dissent. He doesn't believe in the values we believe in.
I believe this society — the Iraqi society can develop in a much better way. I think of the risks, calculated the costs of inaction versus the cost of action. And I'm firmly convinced, if we have to, we will act in the name of peace and in the name of freedom.
Ann?
Q: Mr. President, if you decide to go ahead with military action, there are inspectors on the ground in Baghdad. Will you give them time to leave the country, or the humanitarian workers on the ground, or the journalists? Will you be able to do that and still mount an effective attack on Iraq?
BUSH: Of course, we will give people a chance to leave. And we don't want anybody in harm's way who shouldn't be in harm's way.
The journalists who are there should leave. If you're going and we start action, leave.
The inspectors — we don't want people in harm's way.
And our intention — we have no quarrel with anybody other than Saddam and his group of killers who have destroyed a society.
And we will do everything we can, as I mentioned — and I mean this — to protect innocent life. I've not made up our mind about military action. Hopefully, this can be done peacefully. I believe that, as a result of the pressure that we have placed, and others have placed, that Saddam will disarm and or leave the country.
Ed?
Q: Mr. President, good evening.
Sir, you've talked a lot about trusting the American people when it comes to making decisions about their own lives, about how to spend their own money.
When it comes to the financial costs of the war, sir, it would seem that the administration surely has costed out various scenarios. If that's the case, why not present some of them to the American people so they know what to expect, sir?
BUSH: Ed, we will. We'll present it in the form of a supplemental to the spenders. We don't get to spend the money; as you know, we have to request the expenditure of money from the Congress, and at the appropriate time we'll request a supplemental.
We're obviously analyzing all aspects. We hope we don't go to war, but if we should, we will present a supplemental.
But I want to remind you what I said before.
There is a huge cost when we get attacked. There's a significant cost to our society.
First of all, there's the cost of lives. It's an immeasurable cost. Three thousand people died. Significant cost to our economy. Opportunity loss is an immeasurable cost. Besides the cost of repairing buildings and cost to our airlines. And so, the cost of an attack is significant.
If I thought we were safe from attack, I would be thinking differently. But I see a gathering threat. I mean, it's a true, real threat to America. And therefore, we will deal with it.
And at the appropriate time, Ed, we will ask for a supplemental. And that'll be the moment where you and others will be able to recognize what we think the dollar cost of a conflict will be.
You know, the benefits of such an effort, if, in fact, we go forward and are successful, are also immeasurable. How do you measure the benefit of freedom in Iraq? I guess if you're an Iraqi citizen you can measure it by being able to express your mind, though. How do you measure the consequence of taking a dictator out of power who has tried to invade Kuwait, somebody who may someday decide to lob a weapon of mass destruction on Israel? How would you weigh the cost of that?
Those are immeasurable costs. And I weigh those very seriously.
In terms of the dollar amount, we'll let you know here pretty soon.
George Condon?
Q: If I can follow on Steve's question on North Korea, do you believe it is essential for the security of the United States and its allies that North Korea be prevented from developing nuclear weapons? And are you in any way growing frustrated with the pace of the diplomacy there?
BUSH: Yes, I think it's an issue. Obviously I'm concerned about North Korea developing nuclear weapons, not only for their own use, but for — perhaps they might choose to proliferate them, sell them. They may end up in the hands of dictators, people who are not afraid of using weapons of using weapons of mass destruction, people who try to impose their will on the world or blackmail free nations — concerned about it.
We are working hard to bring a diplomatic solution.
And we've made some progress. After all, the IAEA asked that the Security Council take up the North Korean issue. It's now in the Security Council.
Constantly talking with the Chinese and the Russians and the Japanese and the South Koreans. Colin Powell just went overseas and spent some time in China, went to the inauguration of President Roh in South Korea and spent time in China. And we're working the issue hard, and optimistic that we'll come up with a diplomatic solution.
I certainly hope so.
(Inaudible)?
Q: Thank you, sir.
Mr. President, millions of Americans can recall a time when leaders from both parties set this country on a mission of regime change in Vietnam. Fifty-thousand Americans died. The regime is still there in Hanoi and it hasn't harmed or threatened a single American in 30 years since the war ended.
What can you say tonight, sir, to the sons and the daughters of the Americans who served in Vietnam to assure them that you will not lead this country down a similar path in Iraq?
BUSH: It's a great question.
Our mission is clear in Iraq. Should we have to go in, our mission is very clear: disarmament.
In order to disarm, it will mean regime change. I'm confident that we'll be able to achieve that objective in a way that minimizes the loss of life.
No doubt there's risks with any military operation. I know that. But it's very clear what we intend to do. And our mission won't change. The mission is precisely what I just stated. We've got a plan that will achieve that mission should we need to send forces in.
Last question. Let's see, who needs one? Jean?
Q: Thank you, Mr. President.
In the coming days, the American people are going to hear a lot of debate about this British proposal of a possible deadline being added to the resolution or not. And I know you don't want to tip your hand; this is a great diplomatic moment.
But from the administration's perspective and your own perspective, can you share for the American public what you view as the pros and cons associated with that proposal?
BUSH: You're right, I'm not going to tip my hand.
Q: But could you help them sort out the debate ...
BUSH: Thank you.
Anything that's debated must have resolution to this issue. We're not going to — it makes no sense to allow this issue to continue on and on in the hopes that Saddam Hussein disarms. The whole purpose of the debate is for Saddam to disarm.
We gave him a chance. As a matter of fact, we gave him 12 years of chances. But recently, we gave him a chance starting last fall, and it said, “last chance to disarm.” The resolution said that. And had he chosen to do so, it would be evident that he disarmed. And so more time, more inspectors, more process, in our judgment is not going to affect the peace of the world.
So whatever is resolved is going to have some finality to it, so that Saddam Hussein will take us seriously.
I want to remind you that it is his choice to make as to whether or not we go to war. It's Saddam's choice. He's the person that can make the choice of war and peace. Thus far, he's made the wrong choice. If we have to, for the sake and the security of the American people, for the sake of peace in the world and for freedom to the Iraqi people, we will disarm Saddam Hussein. And by we, it's more than America. A lot of nations will join us.
Thank you for your questions.
Good night.
This has been an important week on two fronts on our war against terror. First, thanks to the hard work of American and Pakistani officials, we captured the mastermind of the September 11th attacks against our nation.
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed conceived and planned the hijackings and directed the actions of the hijackers. We believe his capture will further disrupt the terror network and their planning for additional attacks.
Second, we have arrived at an important moment in confronting the threat posed to our nation and to peace by Saddam Hussein and his weapons of terror.
In New York tomorrow, the United Nations Security Council will receive an update from the chief weapons inspector. The world needs him to answer a single question: Has the Iraqi regime fully and unconditionally disarmed as required by Resolution 1441 or has it not?
Iraq's dictator has made a public show of producing and destroying a few missiles, missiles that violate the restrictions set out more than 10 years ago.
Yet our intelligence shows that even as he is destroying these few missiles, he has ordered the continued production of the very same type of missiles.
Iraqi operatives continue to hide biological and chemical agents to avoid detection by inspectors.
In some cases, these materials have been moved to different locations every 12 to 24 hours or placed in vehicles that are in residential neighborhoods.
We know from multiple intelligence sources that Iraqi weapons scientists continue to be threatened with harm should they cooperate with U.N. inspectors.
Scientists are required by Iraqi intelligence to wear concealed recording devices during interviews, and hotels where interviews take place are bugged by the regime.
These are not the actions of a regime that is disarming. These are the actions of a regime engaged in a willful charade. These are the actions of a regime that systematically and deliberately is defying the world.
If the Iraqi regime were disarming, we would know it because we would see it. Iraq's weapons would be presented to inspectors and the world would witness their destruction.
Instead, with the world demanding disarmament, and more than 200,000 troops positioned near his country, Saddam Hussein's response is to produce a few weapons for show, while he hides the rest and builds even more.
Inspection teams do not need more time or more personnel. All they need is what they have never received — the full cooperation of the Iraqi regime.
Token gestures are not acceptable. The only acceptable outcome is the one already defined by a unanimous vote of the Security Council: total disarmament.
Great Britain, Spain and the United States have introduced a new resolution stating that Iraq has failed to meet the requirements of Resolution 1441. Saddam Hussein is not disarming. This is a fact. It cannot be denied.
Saddam Hussein has a long history of reckless aggression and terrible crimes. He possesses weapons of terror. He provides funding and training and safe haven to terrorists, terrorists who would willingly use weapons of mass destruction against America and other peace-loving countries.
Saddam Hussein and his weapons are a direct threat to this country, to our people and to all free people.
If the world fails to confront the threat posed by the Iraqi regime, refusing to use force even as a last resort, free nations would assume the immense and unacceptable risks.
The attacks of September the 11th, 2001, show what the enemies of America did with four airplanes. We will not wait to see what terrorists or terrorist states could do with weapons of mass destruction.
We are determined to confront threats wherever they arise. I will not leave the American people at the mercy of the Iraqi dictator and his weapons.
In the event of conflict, America also accepts our responsibility to protect innocent lives in every way possible.
We will bring food and medicine to the Iraqi people. We will help that nation to build a just government after decades of brutal dictatorship.
The form and leadership of that government is for the Iraqi people to choose. Anything they choose will be better than the misery and torture and murder they have known under Saddam Hussein.
Across the world and in every part of America people of good will are hoping and praying for peace. Our goal is peace for our nation, for our friends and allies, for the people of the Middle East.
People of good will must also recognize that allowing a dangerous dictator to defy the world and harbor weapons of mass murder and terror is not peace at all, it is pretense.
The cause of peace will be advanced only when the terrorists lose a wealthy patron and protector, and when the dictator is fully and finally disarmed.
Tonight I thank the men and women of our armed services and their families.
I know their deployment so far from home is causing hardship for many military families. Our nation is deeply grateful to all who serve in uniform.
We appreciate your commitment, your idealism and your sacrifice. We support you. And we know that if peace must be defended, you are ready.
Ron Fournier?
Q: Let me see if I can further — if you could further define what you just called this important moment we're in. Since you made it clear just now that you don't think that Saddam has disarmed and we have a quarter million troops in the Persian Gulf and now that you've called on the world to be ready to use force as a last resort, are we just days away from the point at which you decide whether or not we go to war? And what harm would it do to give Saddam a final ultimatum, a two- or three-day deadline to disarm or face force?
BUSH: Well, we're still in the final stages of diplomacy. I'm spending a lot of time on the phone talking to fellow leaders about the need for the United Nations Security Council to state the facts, which is Saddam Hussein hasn't disarmed.
1441, the Security Council resolution passed unanimously last fall, said clearly that Saddam Hussein has one last chance to disarm.
He hasn't disarmed. So we're working with Security Council members to resolve this issue at the Security Council.
This is not only an important moment for the security of our nation, I believe it's an important moment for the Security Council itself. And the reason I say that is because this issue has been before the Security Council, the issue of disarmament of Iraq, for 12 long years.
And the fundamental question facing the Security Council is will its words mean anything; when the Security Council speaks, will the words have merit and weight? I think it's important for those words to have merit and weight, because I understand that in order to win the war against terror, there must be a united effort to do so. And we must work together to defeat terror.
Iraq is a part of the war on terror. Iraq is a country that has got terrorist ties, it's a country with wealth, it's a country that trains terrorists, a country that could arm terrorists. And our fellow Americans must understand, in this new war against terror, that we not only must chase down al-Qaida terrorists, we must deal with weapons of mass destruction as well.
That's what the United Nations Security Council has been talking about for 12 long years.
It's now time for this issue to come to a head at the Security Council, and it will.
As far as ultimatums and all of the speculation about what may or may not happen after next week, we'll just wait and see.
Steve?
Q: (Inaudible)
BUSH: Well, we're days away from resolving this issue at the Security Council.
Q: Thank you. Another hot spot is North Korea. If North Korea restarts their plutonium plant, will that change your thinking about how to handle this crisis? Or are you resigned to North Korea becoming a nuclear power?
BUSH: This is a regional issue. I say regional issue because there's a lot of countries that have got a direct stake into whether or not North Korea has nuclear weapons. We've got a stake as to whether North Korea has a nuclear weapon. China clearly has a stake as to whether or not North Korea has a nuclear weapon. South Korea, of course, has a stake. Japan has got a significant stake as to whether or not North Korea has a nuclear weapon. Russia has a stake.
So, therefore, I think the best way to deal with this is in multilateral fashion by convincing those nations that they must stand up to their responsibility, along with the United States, to convince Kim Jong Il that the development of a nuclear arsenal is not in his nation's interests, and that should he want help in easing the suffering of the North Korean people, the best way to achieve that help is to not proceed forward.
We've tried bilateral negotiations with North Korea. My predecessor, in a good-faith effort, entered into a framework agreement. The United States honored its side of the agreement; North Korea didn't.
While we felt the agreement was enforced, North Korea was enriching uranium. In my judgment the best way to deal with North Korea is to convince the parties to assume their responsibility.
I was heartened by the fact that Jiang Zemin, when he came to Crawford, Texas, made it very clear to me and publicly, as well, that a nuclear weapons-free peninsula was in China's interests.
And so we're working with China and the other nations I mentioned to bring a multilateral pressure and to convince Kim Jong Il that the development of a nuclear arsenal is not in his interests.
Dave?
Q: Mr. President, you and your top advisers, notably Secretary of State Powell, have repeatedly said that we have shared with our allies all of the current, up-to-date intelligence information that proves the imminence of the threat we face from Saddam Hussein and that they have been sharing their intelligence as well. If all of these nations, all of them our normal allies, have access to the same intelligence information, why is it that they are reluctant to think that the threat is so real, so imminent that we need to move to the brink of war now?
And in relation to that, today, the British foreign minister, Jack Straw, suggested at the U.N. that it might be time to look at amending the resolution perhaps with an eye toward a timetable, like that proposed by the Canadians some two weeks ago, that would set a firm deadline to give Saddam Hussein a little bit of time to come clean. And also, obviously, that would give you a little bit of a chance to build more support with any members of the Security Council.
Is that something that the governments should be pursuing at the U.N. right now?
BUSH: We, of course, are consulting with our allies at the United Nations.
But I meant what I said. This is the last phase of diplomacy. A little bit more time: Saddam Hussein has had 12 years to disarm. He is deceiving people. This is important for our fellow citizens to realize that if he really intended to disarm like the world has asked him to do, we would know whether he was disarming. He's trying to buy time.
I can understand why: He's been successful with these tactics for 12 years.
Saddam Hussein is a threat to our nation. September the 11th changed the strategic thinking, at least as far as I was concerned, for how to protect our country. My job is to protect the American people.
It used to be that we could think that you could contain a person like Saddam Hussein, that oceans would protect us from his type of terror.
September the 11th should say to the American people that we are now a battlefield, that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist organization could be deployed here at home.
So therefore I think the threat is real. And so do a lot of other people in my government. And since I believe the threat is real and since my most important job is to protect the security of the American people, that's precisely what we will do.
Our demands are that Saddam Hussein disarm. We hope he does. We have worked with the international community to convince him to disarm. If he doesn't disarm, we'll disarm him.
You asked about sharing of intelligence, and I appreciate that, because we do share a lot of intelligence with nations which may or may not agree with us in the Security Council as to how to deal with Saddam Hussein and his threats.
We've got roughly 90 countries engaged in Operating Enduring Freedom, chasing down the terrorists. We do communicate a lot. And we will continue to communicate a lot.
We must communicate. We must share intelligence. We must share — we must cut off money together. We must smoke these al-Qaida types out one at a time.
It's in our national interest as well that we deal with Saddam Hussein.
But America is not alone in this sentiment. There are a lot of countries who fully understand the threat of Saddam Hussein. A lot of countries realize that the credibility of the Security Council is at stake; a lot of countries, like America, who hope that he would have disarmed, and a lot of countries which realize that it may require force, may require force to disarm him.
Jim Angle?
Q: Thank you, Mr. President.
Sir, if you haven't already made the choice to go to war, can you tell us what you are waiting to hear or see before you do make that decision?
And if I may, during a recent demonstration many of the protesters suggested that the U.S. was a threat to peace, which prompted you to wonder out loud why they didn't see Saddam Hussein as a threat to peace.
I wonder why you think so many people around the world take a different view of the threat that Saddam Hussein poses than you and your allies.
BUSH: Well, first, I — you know, I appreciate societies in which people can express their opinion. That society — free speech stands in stark contrast to Iraq.
Secondly, I've seen all kinds of protests since I've been the president.
I remember the protests against trade. A lot of people didn't feel like free trade was good for the world. I completely disagree. I think free trade is good for both wealthy and impoverished nations. But that didn't change my opinion about trade. As a matter of fact, I went to the Congress to get trade promotion authority.
I recognize there are people who don't like war. I don't like war.
I wish that Saddam Hussein had listened to the demands of the world and disarmed. That was my hope.
That's why I first went to the United Nations to begin with on September the 12th, 2002, to address this issue as forthrightly as I knew how.
That's why, months later, we went to the Security Council to get another resolution, called 1441, which was unanimously approved by the Security Council demanding that Saddam Hussein disarm.
I'm hopeful that he does disarm.
But in the name of peace and the security of our people, if he won't do so voluntarily, we will disarm him, and other nations will join him — join us in disarming him.
And that creates a certain sense of anxiety. I understand that. Nobody likes war.
The only thing I can do is assure the loved ones of those who wear our uniform that if we have to go to war, if war is upon us because Saddam Hussein has made that choice, we will have the best equipment available for our troops, the best plan available for victory, and we will respect innocent life in Iraq.
The risk of doing nothing, the risk of hoping that Saddam Hussein changes his mind and becomes a gentle soul, the risk that somehow inaction will make the world safer, is a risk I'm not willing to take for the American people.
King — John King?
(Crosstalk)
BUSH: This is unscripted.
Q: Thank you, Mr. President. Sir, how would you answer your critics who say that they think this is somehow personal? As Senator Kennedy put it tonight, he said your fixation with Saddam Hussein is making the world a more dangerous place.
And as you prepare the American people for the possibility of military conflict, could you share with us any of the scenarios your advisers have shared with you about worst-case scenarios, in terms of the potential cost of American lives, the potential cost to the American economy and the potential risks of retaliatory terrorist strikes here at home?
BUSH: My job is to protect America and that's exactly what I'm going to do.
People can describe all kinds of intentions. I swore to protect and defend the Constitution, that's what I swore to do. I put my hand on the Bible and took that oath. And that's exactly what I am going to do.
I believe Saddam Hussein is a threat to the American people. I believe he's a threat to the neighborhood in which he lives.
And I've got good evidence to believe that. He has weapons of mass destruction, and he has used weapons of mass destruction in his neighborhood and on his own people. He's invaded countries in his neighborhood. He tortures his own people. He's a murderer. He has trained and financed al-Qaida-type organizations before — al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations.
I take the threat seriously, and I'll deal with the threat. I hope it can be done peacefully.
The rest of your six-point question?
Q: The potential crisis in terms of ...
BUSH: No, thanks.
Q: ... for the economy, terrorism.
BUSH: The price of doing nothing exceeds the price of taking action if we have to. We will do everything we can to minimize the loss of life.
The price of the attacks on America, the cost of the attacks on America on September 11th were enormous. They were significant. And I'm not willing to take that chance again, John.
Terry Moran?
Q: Thank you, sir.
May I follow up on Jim Angle's question? In the past several weeks your policy on Iraq has generated opposition from the governments of France, Russia, China, Germany, Turkey, the Arab League and many other countries, opened a rift at NATO and at the U.N. and drawn millions of ordinary citizens around the world into the streets into anti-war protests.
May I ask what went wrong that so many governments and peoples around the world now not only disagree with you very strongly, but see the U.S. under your leadership as an arrogant power?
BUSH: I think if you remember back prior to the resolution coming out of the United Nations last fall, I suspect you might have asked a question along those lines: How come you can't get anybody to support your resolution? If I remember correctly, there was a lot of doubt as to whether or not we were even going to get any votes. We would get our own, of course.
And the vote came out 15 to nothing, Terry. And I think you will see when it's all said and done, if we have to use force, a lot of nations will be with us.
You clearly name some that — France and Germany express their opinions. We have a disagreement over how best to deal with Saddam Hussein. I understand that.
Having said that, they're still our friends, and we'll deal with them as friends. We've got a lot of common interests. Our trans-Atlantic relationships are very important.
And while they may disagree with how we deal with Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction, there was no disagreement when it came time to vote on 1441, as least as far as France was concerned. They joined us. They said Saddam Hussein has one last chance of disarming.
If they think more time will cause him to disarm, I disagree with that. He's a master of deception. He has no intention of disarming. Otherwise, we would have known.
There's a lot of talk about inspectors. It would have taken a handful of inspectors to determine whether he was disarming. They could've showed up at a parking lot and he could've brought his weapons and destroyed them.
That's not what he chose to do.
Secondly, I make my decisions based upon the oath I took, the one I just described to you. I believe Saddam Hussein is a threat — is a threat to the American people. He's a threat to people in his neighborhood. He's also a threat to the Iraqi people.
One of the things we love in America is freedom. If I may, I'd like to remind you what I said at the State of the Union: Liberty is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to each and every person. And that's what I believe.
I believe that when we see totalitarianism, that we must deal with it. We don't have to do it always militarily.
But this is a unique circumstance because of 12 years of denial and defiance, because of terrorist connections, because of past history.
I'm convinced that a liberated Iraq will be important for that troubled part of the world. The Iraqi people are plenty capable of governing themselves. Iraq's a sophisticated society. Iraq's got money. Iraq will provide a place where people can see that the Shia and the Sunni and the Kurds can get along in a federation. Iraq will serve as a catalyst for change — positive change.
So there's a lot more at stake than just American security and the security of people close by Saddam Hussein. Freedom is at stake, as well. And I take that very seriously.
Gregory?
Q: Mr. President, good evening.
If you order war, can any military operation be considered a success if the United States does not capture Saddam Hussein, as you once said, “dead or alive”?
BUSH: Well, I hope we don't have to go to war. But if we go to war we will disarm Iraq. And if we go to war there will be a regime change. And replacing this cancer inside of Iraq will be a government that represents the rights of all the people, a government which represents the voices of the Shia and the Sunni and the Kurds.
We care about the suffering of the Iraqi people. I mentioned in my opening comments that there's a lot of food ready to go in. There's something like 55,000 oil-for-food distribution points in Iraq.
We know where they are. We fully intend to make sure that they've got ample food. We know where their hospitals are. We want to make sure they've got ample medical supplies.
The life of the Iraqi citizen's going to dramatically improve.
Q: Is success contingent upon capturing or killing Saddam Hussein in your mind?
BUSH: We will be changing the regime of Iraq for the good of the Iraqi people.
Bill Plante?
Q: Mr. President, to a lot of people it seems that war is probably inevitable, because many people doubt — most people I would guess — that Saddam Hussein will ever do what we are demanding that he do, which is disarm.
And if war is inevitable, there are a lot of people in this country — as much as half by polling standards — who agree that he should be disarmed, who listen to you say that you have the evidence, but who feel they haven't seen it, and who still wonder why blood has to be shed if he hasn't attacked us.
BUSH: Well, Bill, if they believe he should be disarmed and he's not going to disarm, there's only way to disarm him. And that is going to be my last choice: the use of force.
Secondly, the American people know that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction.
By the way, he declared he didn't have any. 1441 insisted that he have a complete declaration of his weapons. He said he didn't have any weapons.
And secondly, he's used these weapons before. I mean, we're not speculating about the nature of the man. We know the nature of the man.
Colin Powell, in an eloquent address to the United Nations, described some of the information we were at liberty of talking about. He mentioned a man named al-Zarqawi who is in charge of the poison network. It's a man who was wounded in Afghanistan, received aid in Baghdad, ordered the killing of a U.S. citizen — USAID employee, was harbored in Iraq.
There is a poison plant in northeast Iraq.
To assume that Saddam Hussein knew none of this was going on is not to really understand the nature of the Iraqi society. There's a lot of facts which make it clear to me and many others that Saddam is a threat. And we're not going to wait until he does attack. We're not going to hope that he changes his attitude. We're not going to assume that, you know, he is a different kind of person than he has been.
So in the name of security and peace, if we have to — if we have to, we'll disarm him. I hope he disarms, or perhaps I hope he leaves the country. I hear a lot of talk from different nations around where Saddam Hussein might be exiled. That would be fine with me, just so long as Iraq disarms after he's exiled.
Let's see here, Elizabeth?
Q: Thank you, Mr. President.
As you said, the Security Council faces a vote next week on a resolution implicitly authorizing an attack on Iraq. Will you call for a vote on that resolution, even if you aren't sure you have the votes?
BUSH: Well, first, I don't think — it basically says that he is in defiance of 1441. That's what the resolution says.
And it's hard to believe anybody saying he isn't in defiance of 1441 because 1441 said he must disarm.
And yes, we'll call for a vote.
Q: No matter what?
BUSH: No matter what the whip count is, we're calling for the vote. We want to see people stand up and say what their opinion is about Saddam Hussein and the utility of the United Nations Security Council.
And so, you bet. It's time for people to show their cards, let the world know where they stand when it comes to Saddam.
Mark Knoller?
Q: Mr. President, are you worried that the United States might be viewed as defiant of the United Nations if you went ahead with military action without specific and explicit authorization from the U.N.?
BUSH: No, I'm not worried about that.
As a matter of fact, it's hard to say the United States is defiant about the United Nations when I was the person who took the issue to the United Nations September the 12th, 2002.
We've been working with the United Nations. We've been working through the United Nations.
Secondly, I'm confident the American people understand that when it comes to our security, if we need to act, we will act. And we really don't need United Nations approval to do so.
I want to work — I want the United Nations to be effective. It's important for it to be a robust, capable body. It's important for its words to mean what they say. And as we head into the 21st century, Mark, when it comes to our security, we really don't need anybody's permission.
Bill?
Q: Thank you, Mr. President.
Even though our military can certainly prevail without a northern front, isn't Turkey making it at least slightly more challenging for us, and therefore at least slightly more likely that American lives will be lost? And if they don't reverse course, would you stop backing their entry into the European Union?
BUSH: The answer to your second question is I support Turkey going into the EU.
Turkey's a friend. They're a NATO ally. We'll continue to work with Turkey. We've got contingencies in place that should our troops not come through Turkey — not be allowed to come through Turkey. And no, that won't cause any more hardship for our troops; I'm confident of that.
April, did you have a question, or did I call upon you cold?
Q: No, I have a question.
BUSH: OK, I'm sure you do have a question.
Q: Mr. President, as the nation is at odds over war, with many organizations like the Congressional Black Caucus pushing for continued diplomacy through the U.N., how is your faith guiding you? And what should you tell America? Well, what should America do collectively as you instructed before 9/11? Should it be prayer? Because you are saying, “Let's continue the war on terror.”
BUSH: I appreciate that question a lot.
First, for those who urge more diplomacy, I would simply say that diplomacy hasn't worked. We've tried diplomacy for 12 years. Saddam Hussein hasn't disarmed. He's armed.
And we live in a dangerous world. We live in new circumstances in our country, and I hope people remember the — I know they remember the tragedy of September the 11th, but I hope they understand the lesson of September the 11th.
The lesson is that we're vulnerable to attach wherever it may occur, and we must take threats which gather overseas very seriously. We don't have to deal with them all militarily, but we must deal with them.
And in the case of Iraq, it is now time for him to disarm. For the sake of peace, if we have to use our troops, we will.
My faith sustains me, because I pray daily. I pray for guidance and wisdom and strength.
If we were to commit our troops — if we were to commit our troops I would pray for their safety, and I would pray for the safety of innocent Iraqi lives as well.
One thing that's really great about our country is that there are thousands of people who pray for me who I'll never see and be able to thank. But it's a humbling experience to think that people I will never have met have lifted me and my family up in prayer. And for that I'm grateful. It's been a comforting feeling to know that is true.
I pray for peace, April. I pray for peace.
Hutch?
Q: As you know, not everyone shares your optimistic vision of how this might play out. Do you ever worry, maybe in the wee, small hours, that you might be wrong and they might be right in thinking that this could lead to more terrorism, more anti-American sentiment, more instability in the Middle East?
BUSH: I think, first of all, it's hard to envision more terror on America than September the 11th, 2001. We did nothing to provoke that terrorist attack. It came upon us because there is an enemy which hates America. They hate what we stand for. We love freedom, and we're not changing.
And therefore, so long as there's a terrorist network like al-Qaida and others willing to fund them, finance them, equip them, we're at war.
And so I — you know, obviously I've thought long and hard about the use of troops. I think about it all of the time. It is my responsibility to commit the troops.
I believe we'll prevail. I know we'll prevail.
And out of that disarmament of Saddam will come a better world, particularly for the people who live in Iraq.
This is a society, Ron, who — which has been decimated by his murderous ways, his torture. He doesn't allow dissent. He doesn't believe in the values we believe in.
I believe this society — the Iraqi society can develop in a much better way. I think of the risks, calculated the costs of inaction versus the cost of action. And I'm firmly convinced, if we have to, we will act in the name of peace and in the name of freedom.
Ann?
Q: Mr. President, if you decide to go ahead with military action, there are inspectors on the ground in Baghdad. Will you give them time to leave the country, or the humanitarian workers on the ground, or the journalists? Will you be able to do that and still mount an effective attack on Iraq?
BUSH: Of course, we will give people a chance to leave. And we don't want anybody in harm's way who shouldn't be in harm's way.
The journalists who are there should leave. If you're going and we start action, leave.
The inspectors — we don't want people in harm's way.
And our intention — we have no quarrel with anybody other than Saddam and his group of killers who have destroyed a society.
And we will do everything we can, as I mentioned — and I mean this — to protect innocent life. I've not made up our mind about military action. Hopefully, this can be done peacefully. I believe that, as a result of the pressure that we have placed, and others have placed, that Saddam will disarm and or leave the country.
Ed?
Q: Mr. President, good evening.
Sir, you've talked a lot about trusting the American people when it comes to making decisions about their own lives, about how to spend their own money.
When it comes to the financial costs of the war, sir, it would seem that the administration surely has costed out various scenarios. If that's the case, why not present some of them to the American people so they know what to expect, sir?
BUSH: Ed, we will. We'll present it in the form of a supplemental to the spenders. We don't get to spend the money; as you know, we have to request the expenditure of money from the Congress, and at the appropriate time we'll request a supplemental.
We're obviously analyzing all aspects. We hope we don't go to war, but if we should, we will present a supplemental.
But I want to remind you what I said before.
There is a huge cost when we get attacked. There's a significant cost to our society.
First of all, there's the cost of lives. It's an immeasurable cost. Three thousand people died. Significant cost to our economy. Opportunity loss is an immeasurable cost. Besides the cost of repairing buildings and cost to our airlines. And so, the cost of an attack is significant.
If I thought we were safe from attack, I would be thinking differently. But I see a gathering threat. I mean, it's a true, real threat to America. And therefore, we will deal with it.
And at the appropriate time, Ed, we will ask for a supplemental. And that'll be the moment where you and others will be able to recognize what we think the dollar cost of a conflict will be.
You know, the benefits of such an effort, if, in fact, we go forward and are successful, are also immeasurable. How do you measure the benefit of freedom in Iraq? I guess if you're an Iraqi citizen you can measure it by being able to express your mind, though. How do you measure the consequence of taking a dictator out of power who has tried to invade Kuwait, somebody who may someday decide to lob a weapon of mass destruction on Israel? How would you weigh the cost of that?
Those are immeasurable costs. And I weigh those very seriously.
In terms of the dollar amount, we'll let you know here pretty soon.
George Condon?
Q: If I can follow on Steve's question on North Korea, do you believe it is essential for the security of the United States and its allies that North Korea be prevented from developing nuclear weapons? And are you in any way growing frustrated with the pace of the diplomacy there?
BUSH: Yes, I think it's an issue. Obviously I'm concerned about North Korea developing nuclear weapons, not only for their own use, but for — perhaps they might choose to proliferate them, sell them. They may end up in the hands of dictators, people who are not afraid of using weapons of using weapons of mass destruction, people who try to impose their will on the world or blackmail free nations — concerned about it.
We are working hard to bring a diplomatic solution.
And we've made some progress. After all, the IAEA asked that the Security Council take up the North Korean issue. It's now in the Security Council.
Constantly talking with the Chinese and the Russians and the Japanese and the South Koreans. Colin Powell just went overseas and spent some time in China, went to the inauguration of President Roh in South Korea and spent time in China. And we're working the issue hard, and optimistic that we'll come up with a diplomatic solution.
I certainly hope so.
(Inaudible)?
Q: Thank you, sir.
Mr. President, millions of Americans can recall a time when leaders from both parties set this country on a mission of regime change in Vietnam. Fifty-thousand Americans died. The regime is still there in Hanoi and it hasn't harmed or threatened a single American in 30 years since the war ended.
What can you say tonight, sir, to the sons and the daughters of the Americans who served in Vietnam to assure them that you will not lead this country down a similar path in Iraq?
BUSH: It's a great question.
Our mission is clear in Iraq. Should we have to go in, our mission is very clear: disarmament.
In order to disarm, it will mean regime change. I'm confident that we'll be able to achieve that objective in a way that minimizes the loss of life.
No doubt there's risks with any military operation. I know that. But it's very clear what we intend to do. And our mission won't change. The mission is precisely what I just stated. We've got a plan that will achieve that mission should we need to send forces in.
Last question. Let's see, who needs one? Jean?
Q: Thank you, Mr. President.
In the coming days, the American people are going to hear a lot of debate about this British proposal of a possible deadline being added to the resolution or not. And I know you don't want to tip your hand; this is a great diplomatic moment.
But from the administration's perspective and your own perspective, can you share for the American public what you view as the pros and cons associated with that proposal?
BUSH: You're right, I'm not going to tip my hand.
Q: But could you help them sort out the debate ...
BUSH: Thank you.
Anything that's debated must have resolution to this issue. We're not going to — it makes no sense to allow this issue to continue on and on in the hopes that Saddam Hussein disarms. The whole purpose of the debate is for Saddam to disarm.
We gave him a chance. As a matter of fact, we gave him 12 years of chances. But recently, we gave him a chance starting last fall, and it said, “last chance to disarm.” The resolution said that. And had he chosen to do so, it would be evident that he disarmed. And so more time, more inspectors, more process, in our judgment is not going to affect the peace of the world.
So whatever is resolved is going to have some finality to it, so that Saddam Hussein will take us seriously.
I want to remind you that it is his choice to make as to whether or not we go to war. It's Saddam's choice. He's the person that can make the choice of war and peace. Thus far, he's made the wrong choice. If we have to, for the sake and the security of the American people, for the sake of peace in the world and for freedom to the Iraqi people, we will disarm Saddam Hussein. And by we, it's more than America. A lot of nations will join us.
Thank you for your questions.
Good night.
U.S. had key role in Iraq buildup by Michael Dobbs, Dec.30, 2002 Washington Post
In the 1980s, Saddam was a strategic partner of U.S.
High on the Bush administration’s list of justifications for war against Iraq are President Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons, nuclear and biological programs, and his contacts with international terrorists. What U.S. officials rarely acknowledge is that these offenses date back to a period when Hussein was seen in Washington as a valued ally.
AMONG THE people instrumental in tilting U.S. policy toward Baghdad during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war was Donald H. Rumsfeld, now defense secretary, whose December 1983 meeting with Hussein as a special presidential envoy paved the way for normalization of U.S.-Iraqi relations. Declassified documents show that Rumsfeld traveled to Baghdad at a time when Iraq was using chemical weapons on an “almost daily” basis in defiance of international conventions.
The story of America's involvement with Saddam Hussein in the years before his 1990 attack on Kuwait — which included large-scale intelligence sharing, supply of cluster bombs through a Chilean front company, and facilitating Iraq\s acquisition of chemical and biological precursors — is a topical example of the underside of U.S. foreign policy. It is a world in which deals can be struck with dictators, human rights violations sometimes overlooked, and accommodations made with arms proliferators, all on the principle that the “enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
Throughout the 1980s, Hussein’s Iraq was the sworn enemy of Iran, then still in the throes of an Islamic revolution. U.S. officials saw Baghdad as a bulwark against militant Shiite extremism and the fall of pro-American states such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and even Jordan — a Middle East version of the Communist “domino theory.” That was enough to turn Hussein into a strategic partner and for U.S. diplomats in Baghdad to routinely refer to Iraqi forces as “the good guys,” in contrast to the Iranians, who were depicted as “the bad guys.”
A review of thousands of declassified government documents and interviews with former policymakers shows that U.S. intelligence and logistical support played a crucial role in shoring up Iraqi defenses against the “human wave” attacks by suicidal Iranian troops. The administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush authorized the sale to Iraq of numerous items that had both military and civilian applications, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological viruses, such as anthrax and bubonic plague.
Opinions differ among Middle East experts and former government officials about the pre-Iraqi tilt, and whether Washington could have done more to stop the flow to Baghdad of technology for building weapons of mass destruction. It was a horrible mistake then, but we have got it right now,” says Kenneth M. Pollack, a former CIA military analyst and author of “The Threatening Storm,” which makes the case for war with Iraq. “My fellow [CIA] analysts and I were warning at the time that Hussein was a very nasty character. We were constantly fighting the State Department.”
“Fundamentally, the policy was justified,” argues David Newton, a former U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, who runs an anti-Hussein radio station in Prague. “We were concerned that Iraq should not lose the war with Iran, because that would have threatened Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Our long-term hope was that Hussein’s government would become less repressive and more responsible.”
What makes present-day Hussein different from the Hussein of the 1980s, say Middle East experts, is the mellowing of the Iranian revolution and the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait that transformed the Iraqi dictator, almost overnight, from awkward ally into mortal enemy. In addition, the United States itself has changed. As a result of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, U.S. policymakers take a much more alarmist view of the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
When the Iran-Iraq war began in September 1980, with an Iraqi attack across the Shatt al Arab waterway that leads to the Persian Gulf, the United States was a bystander. The United States did not have diplomatic relations with either Baghdad or Tehran. U.S. officials had almost as little sympathy for Hussein’s dictatorial brand of Arab nationalism as for the Islamic fundamentalism espoused by Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. As long as the two countries fought their way to a stalemate, nobody in Washington was disposed to intervene.
By the summer of 1982, however, the strategic picture had changed dramatically. After its initial gains, Iraq was on the defensive, and Iranian troops had advanced to within a few miles of Basra, Iraq’s second largest city. U.S. intelligence information suggested the Iranians might achieve a breakthrough on the Basra front, destabilizing Kuwait, the Gulf states, and even Saudi Arabia, thereby threatening U.S. oil supplies.
“You have to understand the geostrategic context, which was very different from where we are now,” said Howard Teicher, a former National Security Council official, who worked on Iraqi policy during the Reagan administration. “Realpolitik dictated that we act to prevent the situation from getting worse.”
To prevent an Iraqi collapse, the Reagan administration supplied battlefield intelligence on Iranian troop buildups to the Iraqis, sometimes through third parties such as Saudi Arabia. The U.S. tilt toward Iraq was enshrined in National Security Decision Directive 114 of Nov. 26, 1983, one of the few important Reagan era foreign policy decisions that still remains classified. According to former U.S. officials, the directive stated that the United States would do “whatever was necessary and legal” to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran.
The presidential directive was issued amid a flurry of reports that Iraqi forces were using chemical weapons in their attempts to hold back the Iranians. In principle, Washington was strongly opposed to chemical warfare, a practice outlawed by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In practice, U.S. condemnation of Iraqi use of chemical weapons ranked relatively low on the scale of administration priorities, particularly compared with the all-important goal of preventing an Iranian victory.
Thus, on Nov. 1, 1983, a senior State Department official, Jonathan T. Howe, told Secretary of State George P. Shultz that intelligence reports showed that Iraqi troops were resorting to “almost daily use of CW” against the Iranians. But the Reagan administration had already committed itself to a large-scale diplomatic and political overture to Baghdad, culminating in several visits by the president’s recently appointed special envoy to the Middle East, Donald H. Rumsfeld.
Secret talking points prepared for the first Rumsfeld visit to Baghdad enshrined some of the language from NSDD 114, including the statement that the United States would regard “any major reversal of Iraq’s fortunes as a strategic defeat for the West.” When Rumsfeld finally met with Hussein on Dec. 20, he told the Iraqi leader that Washington was ready for a resumption of full diplomatic relations, according to a State Department report of the conversation. Iraqi leaders later described themselves as “extremely pleased” with the Rumsfeld visit, which had “elevated U.S.-Iraqi relations to a new level.”
In a September interview with CNN, Rumsfeld said he “cautioned” Hussein about the use of chemical weapons, a claim at odds with declassified State Department notes of his 90-minute meeting with the Iraqi leader. A Pentagon spokesman, Brian Whitman, now says that Rumsfeld raised the issue not with Hussein, but with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz. The State Department notes show that he mentioned it largely in passing as one of several matters that “inhibited” U.S. efforts to assist Iraq.
Rumsfeld has also said he had “nothing to do” with helping Iraq in its war against Iran. Although former U.S. officials agree that Rumsfeld was not one of the architects of the Reagan administration’s tilt toward Iraq — he was a private citizen when he was appointed Middle East envoy — the documents show that his visits to Baghdad led to closer U.S.-Iraqi cooperation on a wide variety of fronts. Washington was willing to resume diplomatic relations immediately, but Hussein insisted on delaying such a step until the following year.
As part of its opening to Baghdad, the Reagan administration removed Iraq from the State Department terrorism list in February 1982, despite heated objections from Congress. Without such a move, Teicher says, it would have been “impossible to take even the modest steps we were contemplating” to channel assistance to Baghdad. Iraq — along with Syria, Libya, and South Yemen — was one of four original countries on the list, which was first drawn up in 1979.
Some former U.S. officials say that removing Iraq from the terrorism list provided an incentive to Hussein to expel the Palestinian guerrilla leader Abu Nidal from Baghdad in 1983. On the other hand, Iraq continued to play host to alleged terrorists throughout the ’80s. The most notable was Abu Abbas, leader of the Palestine Liberation Front, who found refuge in Baghdad after being expelled from Tunis for masterminding the 1985 hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro, which resulted in the killing of an elderly American tourist.
While Rumsfeld was talking to Hussein and Aziz in Baghdad, Iraqi diplomats and weapons merchants were fanning out across Western capitals for a diplomatic charm offensive-cum-arms buying spree. In Washington, the key figure was the Iraqi charge d’affaires, Nizar Hamdoon, a fluent English speaker who impressed Reagan administration officials as one of the most skillful lobbyists in town.
“He arrived with a blue shirt and a white tie, straight out of the mafia,” recalled Geoffrey Kemp, a Middle East specialist in the Reagan White House. “Within six months, he was hosting suave dinner parties at his residence, which he parlayed into a formidable lobbying effort. He was particularly effective with the American Jewish community.”
One of Hamdoon’s favorite props, says Kemp, was a green Islamic scarf allegedly found on the body of an Iranian soldier. The scarf was decorated with a map of the Middle East showing a series of arrows pointing toward Jerusalem. Hamdoon used to “parade the scarf” to conferences and congressional hearings as proof that an Iranian victory over Iraq would result in “Israel becoming a victim along with the Arabs.”
According to a sworn court affidavit prepared by Teicher in 1995, the United States “actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credits, by providing military intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure Iraq had the military weaponry required.” Teicher said in the affidavit that former CIA director William Casey used a Chilean company, Cardoen, to supply Iraq with cluster bombs that could be used to disrupt the Iranian human wave attacks. Teicher refuses to discuss the affidavit.
At the same time the Reagan administration was facilitating the supply of weapons and military components to Baghdad, it was attempting to cut off supplies to Iran under “Operation Staunch.” Those efforts were largely successful, despite the glaring anomaly of the 1986 Iran-contra scandal when the White House publicly admitted trading arms for hostages, in violation of the policy that the United States was trying to impose on the rest of the world.
Although U.S. arms manufacturers were not as deeply involved as German or British companies in selling weaponry to Iraq, the Reagan administration effectively turned a blind eye to the export of “dual use” items such as chemical precursors and steel tubes that can have military and civilian applications. According to several former officials, the State and Commerce departments promoted trade in such items as a way to boost U.S. exports and acquire political leverage over Hussein.
When United Nations weapons inspectors were allowed into Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, they compiled long lists of chemicals, missile components, and computers from American suppliers, including such household names as Union Carbide and Honeywell, which were being used for military purposes.
A 1994 investigation by the Senate Banking Committee turned up dozens of biological agents shipped to Iraq during the mid-’80s under license from the Commerce Department, including various strains of anthrax, subsequently identified by the Pentagon as a key component of the Iraqi biological warfare program. The Commerce Department also approved the export of insecticides to Iraq, despite widespread suspicions that they were being used for chemical warfare.
The fact that Iraq was using chemical weapons was hardly a secret. In February 1984, an Iraqi military spokesman effectively acknowledged their use by issuing a chilling warning to Iran. “The invaders should know that for every harmful insect, there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it . . . and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide.
In late 1987, the Iraqi air force began using chemical agents against Kurdish resistance forces in northern Iraq that had formed a loose alliance with Iran, according to State Department reports. The attacks, which were part of a “scorched earth” strategy to eliminate rebel-controlled villages, provoked outrage on Capitol Hill and renewed demands for sanctions against Iraq. The State Department and White House were also outraged — but not to the point of doing anything that might seriously damage relations with Baghdad.
“The U.S.-Iraqi relationship is . . . important to our long-term political and economic objectives,” Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy wrote in a September 1988 memorandum that addressed the chemical weapons question. “We believe that economic sanctions will be useless or counterproductive to influence the Iraqis.”
Bush administration spokesmen have cited Hussein’s use of chemical weapons “against his own people” — and particularly the March 1988 attack on the Kurdish village of Halabjah — to bolster their argument that his regime presents a “grave and gathering danger” to the United States.
The Iraqis continued to use chemical weapons against the Iranians until the end of the Iran-Iraq war. A U.S. air force intelligence officer, Rick Francona, reported finding widespread use of Iraqi nerve gas when he toured the Al Faw peninsula in southern Iraq in the summer of 1988, after its recapture by the Iraqi army. The battlefield was littered with atropine injectors used by panicky Iranian troops as an antidote against Iraqi nerve gas attacks.
Far from declining, the supply of U.S. military intelligence to Iraq actually expanded in 1988, according to a 1999 book by Francona, “Ally to Adversary: an Eyewitness Account of Iraq’s Fall from Grace.” Informed sources said much of the battlefield intelligence was channeled to the Iraqis by the CIA office in Baghdad.
Although U.S. export controls to Iraq were tightened up in the late 1980s, there were still many loopholes. In December 1988, Dow Chemical sold $1.5 million of pesticides to Iraq, despite U.S. government concerns that they could be used as chemical warfare agents. An Export-Import Bank official reported in a memorandum that he could find “no reason” to stop the sale, despite evidence that the pesticides were “highly toxic” to humans and would cause death “from asphyxiation.”
The U.S. policy of cultivating Hussein as a moderate and reasonable Arab leader continued right up until he invaded Kuwait in August 1990, documents show. When the then-U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, met with Hussein on July 25, 1990, a week before the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, she assured him that Bush “wanted better and deeper relations,” according to an Iraqi transcript of the conversation. “President Bush is an intelligent man,” the ambassador told Hussein, referring to the father of the current president. “He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq.”
“Everybody was wrong in their assessment of Saddam,” said Joe Wilson, Glaspie’s former deputy at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, and the last U.S. official to meet with Hussein. “Everybody in the Arab world told us that the best way to deal with Saddam was to develop a set of economic and commercial relationships that would have the effect of moderating his behavior. History will demonstrate that this was a miscalculation.
High on the Bush administration’s list of justifications for war against Iraq are President Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons, nuclear and biological programs, and his contacts with international terrorists. What U.S. officials rarely acknowledge is that these offenses date back to a period when Hussein was seen in Washington as a valued ally.
AMONG THE people instrumental in tilting U.S. policy toward Baghdad during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war was Donald H. Rumsfeld, now defense secretary, whose December 1983 meeting with Hussein as a special presidential envoy paved the way for normalization of U.S.-Iraqi relations. Declassified documents show that Rumsfeld traveled to Baghdad at a time when Iraq was using chemical weapons on an “almost daily” basis in defiance of international conventions.
The story of America's involvement with Saddam Hussein in the years before his 1990 attack on Kuwait — which included large-scale intelligence sharing, supply of cluster bombs through a Chilean front company, and facilitating Iraq\s acquisition of chemical and biological precursors — is a topical example of the underside of U.S. foreign policy. It is a world in which deals can be struck with dictators, human rights violations sometimes overlooked, and accommodations made with arms proliferators, all on the principle that the “enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
Throughout the 1980s, Hussein’s Iraq was the sworn enemy of Iran, then still in the throes of an Islamic revolution. U.S. officials saw Baghdad as a bulwark against militant Shiite extremism and the fall of pro-American states such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and even Jordan — a Middle East version of the Communist “domino theory.” That was enough to turn Hussein into a strategic partner and for U.S. diplomats in Baghdad to routinely refer to Iraqi forces as “the good guys,” in contrast to the Iranians, who were depicted as “the bad guys.”
A review of thousands of declassified government documents and interviews with former policymakers shows that U.S. intelligence and logistical support played a crucial role in shoring up Iraqi defenses against the “human wave” attacks by suicidal Iranian troops. The administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush authorized the sale to Iraq of numerous items that had both military and civilian applications, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological viruses, such as anthrax and bubonic plague.
Opinions differ among Middle East experts and former government officials about the pre-Iraqi tilt, and whether Washington could have done more to stop the flow to Baghdad of technology for building weapons of mass destruction. It was a horrible mistake then, but we have got it right now,” says Kenneth M. Pollack, a former CIA military analyst and author of “The Threatening Storm,” which makes the case for war with Iraq. “My fellow [CIA] analysts and I were warning at the time that Hussein was a very nasty character. We were constantly fighting the State Department.”
“Fundamentally, the policy was justified,” argues David Newton, a former U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, who runs an anti-Hussein radio station in Prague. “We were concerned that Iraq should not lose the war with Iran, because that would have threatened Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Our long-term hope was that Hussein’s government would become less repressive and more responsible.”
What makes present-day Hussein different from the Hussein of the 1980s, say Middle East experts, is the mellowing of the Iranian revolution and the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait that transformed the Iraqi dictator, almost overnight, from awkward ally into mortal enemy. In addition, the United States itself has changed. As a result of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, U.S. policymakers take a much more alarmist view of the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
U.S. SHIFTS IN IRAN-IRAQ WAR
When the Iran-Iraq war began in September 1980, with an Iraqi attack across the Shatt al Arab waterway that leads to the Persian Gulf, the United States was a bystander. The United States did not have diplomatic relations with either Baghdad or Tehran. U.S. officials had almost as little sympathy for Hussein’s dictatorial brand of Arab nationalism as for the Islamic fundamentalism espoused by Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. As long as the two countries fought their way to a stalemate, nobody in Washington was disposed to intervene.
By the summer of 1982, however, the strategic picture had changed dramatically. After its initial gains, Iraq was on the defensive, and Iranian troops had advanced to within a few miles of Basra, Iraq’s second largest city. U.S. intelligence information suggested the Iranians might achieve a breakthrough on the Basra front, destabilizing Kuwait, the Gulf states, and even Saudi Arabia, thereby threatening U.S. oil supplies.
“You have to understand the geostrategic context, which was very different from where we are now,” said Howard Teicher, a former National Security Council official, who worked on Iraqi policy during the Reagan administration. “Realpolitik dictated that we act to prevent the situation from getting worse.”
To prevent an Iraqi collapse, the Reagan administration supplied battlefield intelligence on Iranian troop buildups to the Iraqis, sometimes through third parties such as Saudi Arabia. The U.S. tilt toward Iraq was enshrined in National Security Decision Directive 114 of Nov. 26, 1983, one of the few important Reagan era foreign policy decisions that still remains classified. According to former U.S. officials, the directive stated that the United States would do “whatever was necessary and legal” to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran.
The presidential directive was issued amid a flurry of reports that Iraqi forces were using chemical weapons in their attempts to hold back the Iranians. In principle, Washington was strongly opposed to chemical warfare, a practice outlawed by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In practice, U.S. condemnation of Iraqi use of chemical weapons ranked relatively low on the scale of administration priorities, particularly compared with the all-important goal of preventing an Iranian victory.
Thus, on Nov. 1, 1983, a senior State Department official, Jonathan T. Howe, told Secretary of State George P. Shultz that intelligence reports showed that Iraqi troops were resorting to “almost daily use of CW” against the Iranians. But the Reagan administration had already committed itself to a large-scale diplomatic and political overture to Baghdad, culminating in several visits by the president’s recently appointed special envoy to the Middle East, Donald H. Rumsfeld.
Secret talking points prepared for the first Rumsfeld visit to Baghdad enshrined some of the language from NSDD 114, including the statement that the United States would regard “any major reversal of Iraq’s fortunes as a strategic defeat for the West.” When Rumsfeld finally met with Hussein on Dec. 20, he told the Iraqi leader that Washington was ready for a resumption of full diplomatic relations, according to a State Department report of the conversation. Iraqi leaders later described themselves as “extremely pleased” with the Rumsfeld visit, which had “elevated U.S.-Iraqi relations to a new level.”
In a September interview with CNN, Rumsfeld said he “cautioned” Hussein about the use of chemical weapons, a claim at odds with declassified State Department notes of his 90-minute meeting with the Iraqi leader. A Pentagon spokesman, Brian Whitman, now says that Rumsfeld raised the issue not with Hussein, but with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz. The State Department notes show that he mentioned it largely in passing as one of several matters that “inhibited” U.S. efforts to assist Iraq.
Rumsfeld has also said he had “nothing to do” with helping Iraq in its war against Iran. Although former U.S. officials agree that Rumsfeld was not one of the architects of the Reagan administration’s tilt toward Iraq — he was a private citizen when he was appointed Middle East envoy — the documents show that his visits to Baghdad led to closer U.S.-Iraqi cooperation on a wide variety of fronts. Washington was willing to resume diplomatic relations immediately, but Hussein insisted on delaying such a step until the following year.
As part of its opening to Baghdad, the Reagan administration removed Iraq from the State Department terrorism list in February 1982, despite heated objections from Congress. Without such a move, Teicher says, it would have been “impossible to take even the modest steps we were contemplating” to channel assistance to Baghdad. Iraq — along with Syria, Libya, and South Yemen — was one of four original countries on the list, which was first drawn up in 1979.
Some former U.S. officials say that removing Iraq from the terrorism list provided an incentive to Hussein to expel the Palestinian guerrilla leader Abu Nidal from Baghdad in 1983. On the other hand, Iraq continued to play host to alleged terrorists throughout the ’80s. The most notable was Abu Abbas, leader of the Palestine Liberation Front, who found refuge in Baghdad after being expelled from Tunis for masterminding the 1985 hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro, which resulted in the killing of an elderly American tourist.
IRAQ LOBBIES FOR ARMS
While Rumsfeld was talking to Hussein and Aziz in Baghdad, Iraqi diplomats and weapons merchants were fanning out across Western capitals for a diplomatic charm offensive-cum-arms buying spree. In Washington, the key figure was the Iraqi charge d’affaires, Nizar Hamdoon, a fluent English speaker who impressed Reagan administration officials as one of the most skillful lobbyists in town.
“He arrived with a blue shirt and a white tie, straight out of the mafia,” recalled Geoffrey Kemp, a Middle East specialist in the Reagan White House. “Within six months, he was hosting suave dinner parties at his residence, which he parlayed into a formidable lobbying effort. He was particularly effective with the American Jewish community.”
One of Hamdoon’s favorite props, says Kemp, was a green Islamic scarf allegedly found on the body of an Iranian soldier. The scarf was decorated with a map of the Middle East showing a series of arrows pointing toward Jerusalem. Hamdoon used to “parade the scarf” to conferences and congressional hearings as proof that an Iranian victory over Iraq would result in “Israel becoming a victim along with the Arabs.”
According to a sworn court affidavit prepared by Teicher in 1995, the United States “actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credits, by providing military intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure Iraq had the military weaponry required.” Teicher said in the affidavit that former CIA director William Casey used a Chilean company, Cardoen, to supply Iraq with cluster bombs that could be used to disrupt the Iranian human wave attacks. Teicher refuses to discuss the affidavit.
At the same time the Reagan administration was facilitating the supply of weapons and military components to Baghdad, it was attempting to cut off supplies to Iran under “Operation Staunch.” Those efforts were largely successful, despite the glaring anomaly of the 1986 Iran-contra scandal when the White House publicly admitted trading arms for hostages, in violation of the policy that the United States was trying to impose on the rest of the world.
Although U.S. arms manufacturers were not as deeply involved as German or British companies in selling weaponry to Iraq, the Reagan administration effectively turned a blind eye to the export of “dual use” items such as chemical precursors and steel tubes that can have military and civilian applications. According to several former officials, the State and Commerce departments promoted trade in such items as a way to boost U.S. exports and acquire political leverage over Hussein.
When United Nations weapons inspectors were allowed into Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, they compiled long lists of chemicals, missile components, and computers from American suppliers, including such household names as Union Carbide and Honeywell, which were being used for military purposes.
A 1994 investigation by the Senate Banking Committee turned up dozens of biological agents shipped to Iraq during the mid-’80s under license from the Commerce Department, including various strains of anthrax, subsequently identified by the Pentagon as a key component of the Iraqi biological warfare program. The Commerce Department also approved the export of insecticides to Iraq, despite widespread suspicions that they were being used for chemical warfare.
The fact that Iraq was using chemical weapons was hardly a secret. In February 1984, an Iraqi military spokesman effectively acknowledged their use by issuing a chilling warning to Iran. “The invaders should know that for every harmful insect, there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it . . . and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide.
CHEMICALS KILL KURDS
In late 1987, the Iraqi air force began using chemical agents against Kurdish resistance forces in northern Iraq that had formed a loose alliance with Iran, according to State Department reports. The attacks, which were part of a “scorched earth” strategy to eliminate rebel-controlled villages, provoked outrage on Capitol Hill and renewed demands for sanctions against Iraq. The State Department and White House were also outraged — but not to the point of doing anything that might seriously damage relations with Baghdad.
“The U.S.-Iraqi relationship is . . . important to our long-term political and economic objectives,” Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy wrote in a September 1988 memorandum that addressed the chemical weapons question. “We believe that economic sanctions will be useless or counterproductive to influence the Iraqis.”
Bush administration spokesmen have cited Hussein’s use of chemical weapons “against his own people” — and particularly the March 1988 attack on the Kurdish village of Halabjah — to bolster their argument that his regime presents a “grave and gathering danger” to the United States.
The Iraqis continued to use chemical weapons against the Iranians until the end of the Iran-Iraq war. A U.S. air force intelligence officer, Rick Francona, reported finding widespread use of Iraqi nerve gas when he toured the Al Faw peninsula in southern Iraq in the summer of 1988, after its recapture by the Iraqi army. The battlefield was littered with atropine injectors used by panicky Iranian troops as an antidote against Iraqi nerve gas attacks.
Far from declining, the supply of U.S. military intelligence to Iraq actually expanded in 1988, according to a 1999 book by Francona, “Ally to Adversary: an Eyewitness Account of Iraq’s Fall from Grace.” Informed sources said much of the battlefield intelligence was channeled to the Iraqis by the CIA office in Baghdad.
Although U.S. export controls to Iraq were tightened up in the late 1980s, there were still many loopholes. In December 1988, Dow Chemical sold $1.5 million of pesticides to Iraq, despite U.S. government concerns that they could be used as chemical warfare agents. An Export-Import Bank official reported in a memorandum that he could find “no reason” to stop the sale, despite evidence that the pesticides were “highly toxic” to humans and would cause death “from asphyxiation.”
The U.S. policy of cultivating Hussein as a moderate and reasonable Arab leader continued right up until he invaded Kuwait in August 1990, documents show. When the then-U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, met with Hussein on July 25, 1990, a week before the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, she assured him that Bush “wanted better and deeper relations,” according to an Iraqi transcript of the conversation. “President Bush is an intelligent man,” the ambassador told Hussein, referring to the father of the current president. “He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq.”
“Everybody was wrong in their assessment of Saddam,” said Joe Wilson, Glaspie’s former deputy at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, and the last U.S. official to meet with Hussein. “Everybody in the Arab world told us that the best way to deal with Saddam was to develop a set of economic and commercial relationships that would have the effect of moderating his behavior. History will demonstrate that this was a miscalculation.